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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE "NEW 
SCHEME FOR MONETARY CONTROL" 
BY THE BANK OF JAPAN 
By Tsuneo ISHIKAWA* 
Causes and Adverse Effects of Overloan 
Introduction 
In October, 1962, the Bank of Japan decided to adopt the "new scheme for 
monetary control" to regulate supply of credit in lieu of the conventional system 
depending on loans provided by the Bank of Japan. The new scheme consisted of 
buying and selling operations of securities and setting ceiling limit of loans by the 
Bank of Japan. 
According to the statement of the Policy Board at that time of the Bank, it 
"intends to utilize flexible buying and selling of securities as a key means of mone-
tary control". The Bank of Japan "wants to correct the current situation where 
financial institutions depended too heavily on loans from the Bank, and further, to 
promote adequate and harmonious development of finance". Therefore, the Bank 
"hopes that borrowings of the commercial banks provided by the Central Bank will 
not exceed the current limit-indeed, it will exercise strict control over certain 
limited number of commercial banks who actually depend unreasonably on such 
loans". (Ref. 2, pp. 7) 
In other words, the Bank of Japan was anxious to apply a brake on the gallop-
ing over loan situation that followed the record boom period from 1959 to 1960, which 
resulted very quickly in deterioration of loan to deposit ratio of commercial banks 
who borrowed heavily from the Bank of Japan. The aim was to make those banks 
-major city banks in particular-more conscious of their liquidity positions so as 
they would be compelled to exercise self-control on their own initiative. With such 
an objective in mind, BOJ decided to make use of the buying and selling operations 
of securities as the key means of controlling money supply. Loans would be extended, 
but they were to have only the secondary importance. Thus, BOJ thought, would 
enable it to conduct the control in a much more subtle and multifarious ways while 
estahlishing the Bank's initiative in the matter of credit control. Thus, the lending 
limit was set at 1,240 billion yen towards ten city banks whose liquidity positions 
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were particularly unfavorable then. Beyond that limit, these banks were to pay an 
extra penalty interest of 3.65 percent. This was almost equal to prohibit their bor-' 
rowings above the ceiling. 
Causes of Excess Lending by Commercial Banks 
Let us consider why the overloan happened and why they were more than 
undesirable. In general, there are four channels through which funds-cash-is poured 
into the national economy. They are: deficit in Treasury General Account with the 
Public, deficit in the Foreign Exchange Special Account, i.e. surplus of the balance 
of payment, loans made by Bank of ] apan, and finally, buying operation of securities 
by BO]. 
Table I shows how each of these channels worked to increase supply of cash 
currency during thirteen years from 1960 to 1972. Fist of all, for the period of 1960-
62, with regard to the Treasury Funds, both the General Accounts (including the 
Foodstuff Control Special Account) and the Foreign Exchange Special Account re-
corded basically surplus. This was not surprising, since during any period of high 
growth, revenue of income tax increases sharply and funds go back to the Treasury 
Account. In case of ] apan, Treasury Funds are not allowed to be placed in trust 
deposit at commercial banks, hence revenue in excess of disbursement immediately 
reduces funds held by financial institutions. Therefore, any demand for credit must 
be met by increasing loans from BO]. During the period in question, for instance, 
such loans rose sharply-by 686 billion yen alone in 1961. In other words, although 
the lending competition among commercial banks was the fundamental cause of 
overloan, it should be noted the large suplus in Treasury Account was another facet 
of the causes. (Ref. Table 2) 
As for the adverse effect of the overloan, the Bank of Japan was concerned lest 
the overloan-if it were to continue for an extended time-should spoil the com-
mercial banks, because they would come to take it for granted and assume an un-
reasonably lax attitude towards their liquidity position. This would be particularly 
so because the official discount rate had been kept always below the average interest 
rate charged by commercial banks. On the other hand, the city banks were competing 
with each other in order to expand their respective "shares" by pumping money 
into industry without too much discretion. An end result would be overheating of 
economy and a large deficit in the balance of payment. 
However, if buying and selling operations of securities were used as a means to 
regulate money supply, it would mean that a part of the financial assets accumulat-
ed as a result of economic growth (such as public and corporate bonds) would 
gradually move from the commercial banks to the Bank of Japan who in turn would 
supply money to them. Unlike the loans, there will be an effective brake in such a 
system because the money supply could not go beyond the total volume of the 
eligible securities held by the commercial banks. 
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It also means that the commercial banks are required to use their judgement in 
composing their own financial assets, which include bonds eligible for buying by 
BOJ, and to check carefully their liquidity position before extending loans and credit 
to avid borrowers. For instance, if credit is supplied from BOJ on the basis of buying 
operation, the commercial banks would refrain from lending to the last limit because 
they would prefer to keep those eligible securities. If this system operates successfully 
to improve liquidity position of the commercial banks, they in turn will become 
much more conscientious in maintaining a sound position by themselves. In that 
event, there will be an autonomous, self-imposed discipline at wor k, and it would no 
longer be necessary to have recourse to those direct control such as "window gui-
dance" which, if effective, is not, after all, a very elegant method to be used by the 
Bank of Japan. 
Buying and Selling Operations as a Means of Credit Control 
Loans and buying operations are same in the sense that they are both to provide 
credit to commercial banks by BOJ, although there is a significant difference as to 
where the initiative rests. Loans are made possible only because borrowers are eager 
to get money, so it may be said, grosso modo, that borrowers have the first initiative 
(we say grosso modo because under certain circumstances, BOJ may direct borrowers 
to turn to the call money market). Contrarily, in the case of buying operations, the 
initiative clearly lies in the central bank. A loan, once extended, cannot be retired 
until the maturity of its term, regardless of the surrounding circumstances, whereas 
the central bank can always withdraw a credit by selling operation. This system 
not only gives the BOJ a valuable initiative; it enables the Bank to intervene much 
more actively and flexibly. 
I t is well known that this type of monetary control is called open market ope-
rations in the United States and in the United Kingdom. In these countries, financial 
market is fully developed and direct financing by means of a variety of bonds and 
debentures is carried out in the market. The central banks, therefore, can act as if 
they were investors coming to an open market and still exercise effective control 
through the established market mechanism. Both in U.K. and U.S.A., a large volume 
of wartime bonds were dumped into the market soon after the World War II, and the 
authorities were obliged to support the prices by massive buying out of the market. 
However. as the inflationary trends were gaining the momentum towards 1950, buying 
stopped, and the bonds were again resold to the market (this was the so-called 
"revival of the monetary policy"). There-after, the open-market operations became 
one of the most important means to control credit supply. 
Unfortunately, conditions of the postwar finance in Japan did not allow the 
Bank of Japan to utilize such a method. For one thing, the hyper inflation had 
reduced the value of prewar bonds to almost nil, and on the other hand, the govern-
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ment did not issue any long-term bonds until 1965 in order to maintain balanced 
budget. Interest rate was kept intentionally at a low level to accelerate the economic 
growth. All told, therefore, the bonds market was far from mature, or rather, open 
market simply did not exist. The Bank of Japan made a timid start by introducing 
so-called "one-to-one buying and selling operations" which means buying and selling 
of public bonds guaranteed by the government with a repurchase clause to city and 
local banks, trust banks and the long-term credit banks. Although this was a significant 
step forward, it was by no means full-fledged market operations, because BOJ dealt 
with individual banks directly. In absense of the developed market like those in U.S.A. 
and U.K., the Bank of Japan had to develop the market at first in order to make 
bond operations possible. 
Brief History of Bond Operations in Japan 
Ten years have passed since the start of the new system, and it would be ap-
propriate to review briefly how the system has worked so far. 
I t should be noted that even before the start of the new system, the Bank of 
Japan did conduct occasionally buying operations of government-guaranteed public 
bonds. Its purpose, however, was to ease off shortage of funds caused by seasonal 
surplus of Treasury Accounts. Interest rates were fixed without any bearing on 
prevailing market rates, and as mentioned previously, deals were made directly 
between the buying BO J and a seller bank. 
When the new system was initiated in November, 1962, the Bank of Japan 
lowered the buying rate to the same level as that of yield to a subscriber of the 
government-guaranteed bonds. Concurrently, the official discount rate was reduced 
in two steps, in October and November of that year. This made it possible for the 
commercial banks to obtain supply of funds at then prevailing rate by selling the 
eligible bonds to BOJ (who attached the repurchase clause). Although it resembled 
only very remotely to the open-market operations, the system was nevertheless tide 
into the market in a large sense in that interest rate was no longer fixed. 
Already towards the end of Fiscal Year 1962, however, volume of the eligible 
(government-guaranteed) bonds held by the commercial banks fell quickly. According 
to the statistics, amount of bonds held by the commercial banks as of the end of 
that year was 240 billion yen. In the case of previous operations, buying was con-
ducted with the repurchare clause, so holdings of the eligible bonds by commercial 
banks never depleted completely. As BO J increased number of operations and their 
flexibility, however, individual operation gained in size and reached 70 to 100 billion 
yen, and it was natural that the volume of bonds in stock became insufficient. 
Consequently, the Bank added in January, 1963 to the list of the eligible bonds 
the following items: government bonds (40 billion yen), debentures issued by electric 
power companies (200 billion yen), interest bearing bank debentures (400 billion 
yen), and eligible local government bonds (80 billion yen). This added 72Q billion 
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yen to the volume of securities available for buying operation by BOj. In addition, 
the term of repurchase was extended from three months to one year, opening the 
way to outright purchase operation. In March, 1963, BO j exercised the first buying 
operation for the electric debentures and bank debentures, and by the end of that 
fiscal year, there was 484.2 billion yen buying in excess. (Ref. Table I) 
In May, 1964, the scope of the banks eligible for the operation was further en-
larged to include fifty-one mutual loan and saving banks and twenty credit associations. 
This means that even these financial institutions for smaller business firms were now 
able to obtain credit by BOj's buying operations. In the meantime, the official discount 
rate was raised in March, 1964, and during Fiscal Year 1964, the balance of bond 
operations registered selling in excess of 216.3 billion yen. In our opinion, this bears 
witness to the fact that the bond operations were not only a valid means of ensuring 
growth of credit supply to replace to BOj loans, but they were also a very effective 
means of monetary control. The japanese economy calmed down in 1965 and money 
supply was relaxed (for example, the official discount rate was reduced three times 
in succession in january, April and june that year), while demands for funds also 
decreased considerably. Thus, the balance of operations during Fiscal Year 1965 
showed the sales eXCess of 185.5 billion yen (Table I). In july, 1965, a major obstacle 
to successful implementation of buying operations occurred as a result of the drastic 
reduction of the offiical discount rate. Since the interest rate applicable to buying 
operation was linked to the yield to bond subscribers, it stayed above the interest rate 
of BOj loans. For the commercial banks, it was therefore more advantageous to borrow 
from the Bank. Under these circumstances, the Bank o'f japan was compelled to 
suspend for a time being all buying operations, and for this reason, the balance of 
bond operations ended with excess sales as indicated earlier despite the fact tbat 
money supply was increased throughout the fiscal year. On the other hand, loans 
from BOj increased to 297.5 billion yen (Table I). 
During the last quarter of that fiscal year (january to March, 1966), a number 
of situations previously unknown to the bond operations occurred. First of all, the 
government issued the much debated 6.5 % long-term bonds (although they were not 
immediately eligible for buying operation, because one year must go before BOj 
could trade long-term govermment bonds under the law). Also, during the same 
month, the Bank of japan started operations for the short-term government bonds 
with regard to short-term credit brokers (it followed the start of BOj loans to 
those brokers in December, 1965). This was a measure of ensuring adequate money 
supply to the call market with a view to stabilize call money rates and to exercise a 
flexible control of credit by active trading of the government short-term bonds in 
the call money market. 
This short-term bond operation was subject to repurchase within three months. 
Since the start, however, until the end of 1971, trading was very brisk and buying and 
selling continued at the pace of 200 to 300 billion yen for each ten-day period (these 
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transctions, however, do not appear in Table I, which is based on each fiscal year). 
It means that for the fJrst time after the last War, there was established a clear 
division between the bond operation destined for money supply for economic growth 
and short-term government securities operation through call money market to regulate 
short-term money supply. Furthermore, as the public and corporate bonds markel 
was reopened in February, 1966, Bank of Japan started to conduct outright purchase 
of bonds at market price in addition to the conventional buying with the repurchase 
clause. Thus,] apan's bonds operations made a farther stride ahead towards a real 
open market operations. 
Buying Operations of Long-Term Government Bonds 
Towards the end of Fiscal Year 1966, there occured again a shortage of govern-
ment guaranteed bonds eligible for buying operation by BO]. The Bank lost no time 
to start buying of the long-time government bonds issued a year ago, and also dur-
ing the same month, i.e., February, 1967, it made outright purchases of certain 
government-guaranteed bonds and interest bearing bank debentures. Operation of 
foreign exchange bills also started at that time, but the amount was insignificant 
(under one billion yen per month) and was subsequently abolished in June, 1972 
when operations of commercial bills were started. During the fiscal year 1966, there 
was an excess buying balance of 562.4 billion yen. Major items were the outright 
purchase of government-guaranted bonds and buying of the newly issued 6.5 % long-
term government bonds (Table I). 
As this time, it must be remembered that issuance of government bonds per se 
means withdrawal of treasury funds. It contributes to promote inflation only because 
the funds obtained by the issuance are actually spent to boost effective demand by 
multiplier effect. Issuance of government bonds in itself deflates the money supply. 
During the years that followed 1966, the government issued long-term bonds at the 
amount of several hundreds of billion yen per year, resulting in massive withdrawal 
of treasury funds, while on the other hand large disbursement resulted from the Food-
stuff Control Special Account (reflecting a sharp increase in administered rice price 
for producers) during the fiscal years of 1967 to 1969, and from the Foreign Ex-
change Control Special Account (due to sudden increase in surplus of the balance of 
payment) since the fiscal year of 1968. However, the Treasury General Account 
basically recorded surplus, except for the fiscal year of 1968 which showed excess 
disbur,sement of 347.B billion yen, equilibrium was maintained between the revenues 
and disbursements throughtout the period. Contrarily, during fiscal years 1967 and 
1968, bond operations registered excess buying of 885 billion yen and 409.B billion 
yen respectively, of which outright purchase of government-guaranteed bonds and 
long-term government bonds were the major factors. The balance of BO] loans 
declined continuously in the meantime. 
In ] une, 1969, the Bank of ] apan started a new type of short-term buying ope-
52 T. ISHIKAWA 
ration of bonds which is called seasonal operations. This was buying of government 
bonds, government-guaranteed bonds and interest bearing bank debentures with a 
repurchase clause of one month, and buying price was based on market price and 
interest on call rate, respectively. Bank debentures had been removed from the eligible 
list since tbe start of buying of government bonds, but they were again induded as 
an instrument of buying operations. The new short-term buying operations were 
introduced as a complementary measures of seasonal control for which the Bank of 
] apan had already been buying and selling short term government securities and 
controlling BO] loans. Since June, 1969, this type of buying operations continued 
at the rate of several tens of billion yen per month, and since around November, 
1969, it came to be utilized particularly as a means of supplying yen funds to the 
foreign exchange market (so-called "yen shift", i.e., utilization of usance in Japanese 
yen rather than in foreign currency). 
The Bank of ] apan discontinued this type of short-term operation in August, 
1971 when the BO] started selling operations of bills issued by the Bank. During 
the fiscal years of 1969 to 1970, both the Foodstuff Control Special Account and Foreign 
Exchange Control Special Account recorded large excess disbursements of several 
hundreds of billion yen, but the Treasury General Account had a large surplus. For 
this reason, the Bank of ] apan was compelled to supply, during the fiscal year of 
1969, 553.1 billion yen by means of bond operations and 426.9 billion yen by loans. 
In the following year, the buying operations totaled 707.9 billion yen and loans came 
up to 438.5 billion yen, respectively (Table 1). 
Debut of Operations of Commercial Bills 
The buying operations of the Bank of] apan during the fiscal year of 1970 gained 
in size and 810 billion yen was spent alone in unconditional buying of government 
bonds and other government-guaranteed bonds. There are two major reasons for such 
an enormous buying. Firstly, the Treasury withdraw 707.7 billion yen as tax revenues 
in excess of disbursements, and secondly two years' consecutive high growth of the 
] apanese economy (18.8 % in 1969 and 16.2 % in 1970) boosted demand for money 
supply by leaps and bounds. Already in the fall of 1970, BO] was concerned over 
the possible shortage of eligible bonds for buying operations during the next fiscal 
year, and this led to a decision to study the feasibility of commercial bills operation 
from November, 1970. 
In this connection, there are a few questions of fundamental importance. If, for 
instance, buying operation is limited to those bills eligible for rediscount only, will 
there be any difference between buying operations and loans on rediscount basis? 
An answer to this, as we discussed previously, is the fact that loans cannot be ex-
tended unless borrowers request them, while operations can be carried out by uni-
lateral initiative of BO]. The second problem was if operations were to be extended 
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to commercial bills, how to set the interest rates applicable to such operations in the 
absence of the market. Should the interest rate be equal to the official discount rate, 
which is always below the prevailing interest rates, buying operations under such 
circumstances would amount to continuation of overloan, even if there is a measure 
of one-sided initiative on the part of the Bank of japan. Buying and selling of 
commercial bills can be considered a legitimate step towards the real open market 
operation only when their prices are somehow tied to "market prices". Such opera-
tions should not be regarded as a makeshift solution to the shortage of eligible 
securities. They presuppose existence of effective market of commercial bills, and if 
it does not yet exist, it must be created and developed. 
Creation of Commercial Bills Market 
Under these circumstances, short term credit brokers, upon request of the Bank 
of japan, agreed to consult with the city banks with a view to establish a commercial 
bills market. According to the preliminary plan drawn up by those brokers, the new 
market will (I) deal with those call money funds whose term is 60 days or more, 
(2) the interest rate to be quoted for the 60 day term will be 0.125 % above the rate 
for call money in over-month end, although this will be used as the center rate and 
the actual rates will be quoted flexibly within the range of 0.25 % above and below 
that center rate, and (3) the bills to be traded will be limited to those eligible papers 
issued by qualified corporations (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, April 19, 1971). 
Originally, establishment of the commercial bill market was contemplated with 
a view to form a kind of "price/interest quoting market" only, consistent with the 
BOj plan to start buying and selling operation of commercial bills (ibid). However, 
japan's international balance of payment started to register large amounts of surplus 
every month from the beginning of 1971, which led to expansion of disbursements 
from the Foreign Exchange Control Special Account. While only several months ago, 
funds were short and there were not enough eligible securities for BOj to buy, by 
the end of May, 1971, the situation was completely reversed and the authorities were 
worried about excess liquidity. The Bank of japan therefore expected to postpone 
start of buying commercial bills until the beginning of 1972. The short term credit 
brokers nevertheless decided to open the commercial bill market on their own initia-
tive as a step to prepare themselves for the operation of commercial bills in future. 
In reality, there was such a large excess liquidity as already mentioned, and the 
Bank of japan felt it necessary to sell BO] bills and olher commercial papers in its 
posession towards the end of May, 1971. It was ironical that the original scheme of 
developing a commercial bill market in order to supply much needed funds by buy-
ing operations' had to be reversed within several months and n'ow the short term 
brokers opened the market on their own initiative, while excess liquidity had to be 
absorbed by selling operations of the Bank of japan. 
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Operation of Commercial Bills Developed as a Means of Seasonal Adjustment 
Satisfied with the steady growth of the new commercial bill market since its 
opening in May, tbe Bank of Japan started to sell BOJ bills in August, 1971. In 
June, 1972, the Bank finally undertook to buy commercial bills in order to ease off 
the seasonal shortage of funds. Thus commercial bill operation became finally a 
regular method of monetary control based on market mechanism rather than on 
one-to-one matching deal, and operations of foreign exchange bills were absorbed 
within the commercial bill operation. 
The fiscal year of 1971 (which saw the first upward revaluation of yen) was remar-
kable in that Treasury Funds registered a spectacular excess disbursement of 3,000 bil-
lion yen as a result of outflow from the Foreign Exchange Control Account of 4,355.6 
billion yen. This caused the BOJ credit to shrink, as repayment of loans to the Bank 
of Japan reached 1,778 billion yen, and overloan to commercial banks virtually dis-
appeared. BOJ's security operation recorded, for the first time since 1965, selling in 
excess of 390 billion yen (total of bonds and bills). 
During the next fiscal year of 1972, large deficit of Foreign Exchange Control 
Account continued, and combined with the easy monetary policy, quantity-theory 
type price increase gained intensity towards the latter part of the year. New issue 
of bank notes reached 1,535 billion yen, a two-fold growth over the previous year. 
Since Treasury revenues and disbursements maintained equilibrium throughout that 
year, the Bank of Japan compelled to expand credit by 2,000 billion, of which 1,079.5 
billion was supplied by loans to commercial banks and 970.3 billion by buying of 
commercial bills and other securities. 
Commercial bill operation of BOJ (started, as previously referred to, in June 
1972 when the Bank started to buy) became very active in 1973. Monthly amount 
of trading has reached several hundreds of billion yen. It now functions as a major 
means of seasonal, short-term monetary control, replacing the conventional buying 
and selling of short-term government securities with the short-term credit brokers. 
In the sence that bills are traded by BOJ at the market rather than with individual 
financial institutions as partners, it is considered to be a significant progress of ope-
ration towards a fullscale open market operation. 
Some Problems Associated with the New Scheme for Monetary Control 
In retrospect, there are two noteworthy aspects in the history of BOJ operations 
in bonds and bills. Firstly, the Bank expanded very quickly the scope of financial 
institutions eligible as partners in the operations at the initial phase. On the other 
hand, kinds of the instruments for buying and selling also increased quickly, with 
occasional exclusions of a few kinds. If the buying and selling operations are to 
consti tute the most important means of monetary con trol for growth instead of loans 
from BOJ, it is quite natural that such expansions should take place in due course. 
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However, a question arises as to the criteria of eligible securities since there, discre-
tion of the policy body-the Bank of Japan-comes into play. For instance, certain 
bonds are directly related to key industries. If debentures issued by electric power com-
panies are selected as the object of buying operations, the Bank of Japan is actually 
going to supply funds to the electric power companies. Another example is the local 
government bonds, most of which are purchased by local banks. As the Bank of 
Japan increases buying of these bonds, more money will flow into the local banks 
rather than to other commercial banks. 
Clearly, there is a danger of distortion in money supply depending on the choice 
of securities for BO] operation. This could be an advantage, since it makes possible 
for BO] to exercise a selective control with direct influence on key industries or 
major sector of the national economy. In other words, one-to-one matching operations 
leave the Central Bank various choices of eligible securities or financial institutions, 
which enables BO] to control money supply selectively, if not arbitrarily. On the 
other hand, BO] might be interested only in controlling money supply in general; 
yet its effect could be selective or arbitrary, depending on the choice of instruments. 
Therefore, it should be kept in mind that operations of securities have a character 
of double-edged sword. In order for the buying and selling operations to become a 
general means of monetary control without any odds and twists, they must orient 
themselves to open market which still remains to be brought into existence at this 
time. 
Prerequisite for Existence of Open Market 
What, then, will be the prerequisite conditions for such an open market to exist? 
If we consider the case of commercial bill market established in May, 1971, it can 
be said that opening of the market induced the lenders of call money with a re-
latively longer term to meet the demand for such money in the market. Already at 
that time, there was a tendency for call loans to go beyond end of month. Also, 
the fact that rates were quoted flexibly within plus and minus 0.25 % around the 
center rate, which is 0.125 % above the call rate, can be considered as a positive 
factor for development of the market. One conclusion we can draw from our ex-
perience would be that such a market can exist where demand and supply are both 
relatively stable (i.e., they do not fluctuate too much within a short period of time) 
and there is a room for quotation to move with flexibility around the reasonable 
level. 
The new commercial bill market satisfied all of these requirements. In case of 
of public and corporation bonds market, yield to subscribers was always pegged to 
a low level because of low interest rate policy and this has prevented the market 
from becoming mature enough for open market operations. Although the public and 
corporation bonds market was reopened in February, 1966 and the Bank of Japan 
immediately started to make outright purchase at market prices, it was not a real 
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market in the sense that it only acted as price/interest quoting market and one-to-one 
transactions continued between BOj and individual financial institutions on the basis 
of such prices and quotations. This still is the case. There is little question that price 
mechanism must be made to work in the public and corporation bonds market if it 
is ready for real operations. This requires liberalization or decontrol of interest 
rates. The fact that interest rates are steadily going up in most of the international 
money markets seems to provide a good opportunity to introduce such a decontrol 
in japan. Domestically, however, this will involve a number of tough problems such 
as drastic increase of financial costs, need to change the taxation system with a view 
to encourage direct financing of corporations, need to make buying and selling of 
public and corporation bonds more accessible to the general public, and some other 
issues of vital importance to the finance. 
How Far the Objectives Have Been Met 
Finally, let us review how far and well various targets have been met by the 
new scheme since its appearance in the japanese monetary control measures. The 
Bank of japan indeed published set of targets prior to the start of operation in 1962. 
First of all, we should take up overloan picture. According to Table 2, it is 
evident that there has been a considerable improvement, particularly in the recent 
past, compared with 1961 which was the worst year. The Bank of japan borrowing 
ratio, i.e., the relationships between BOj and city banks, has achieved a remarkable 
improvement. Contrary to the BOj vs. city banks relationships, improvements are less 
conspicuous between city banks and business corporations (as indicated by the outside 
debt ratio). As we can see from the table, every index shows a drastic improvement 
during 1971, but this owes to excess disbursement from the Foreign Exchange Control 
Special Account. It does not mean any significant development in bonds and bills 
operation. Credit by BO j actually decreased during that year. 
Table 2. Overloan Index of City Banks 
FlY 60 I 61 I 62 i 63 I 64 I 65 I 66 I 67 i 6S i 69 I 70 I 71 72 
lending ratio 
outside debt ratio 
~1~1~ll~il~ ~ ~I ~ ~ ~I ~ ~I ~ 
141 221 221 191' 211 19! 17! 161 151· 161 lsi sl S 
BOj borrowing ratio Sl IS 16[ 12, 9, 91 101 SI s, SI 9! 21 5 
note; 
lending ratio lending x 100 
nf~t deposit + bond.>: issued 
outside debt ratio borrowing+call money-call loan x 100 
net deposit+bonds issued+borrowing+call money call loan 
Bank of Japan borrowing ratio . bo~rowin~ fro: ~gi . X 100 
net depOSIt + ends Issue + borrowwg 
(source: Economic Statistic Annual, Bank of Japan) 
Another question to be asked would be this: has there been any significant 
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change in the attitude of commercial bank-particularly city banks-since the start 
of the new system? Are they more conscious of their liquidity position, and do they 
show any self-imposed discipline in making lending decisions? The outside debt 
figures shown in Table 2 indicates a modest improvement from 1965, and since 1971, 
there occurred a rapid improvement reflecting deficit in the Foreign Exchange Control 
Special Account as well as the easy monetary policy during that period. City banks, 
however, do not appear to have tried to maintain sound liquidity position by taking 
the advantage of this sudden increase of money supply. They started towards the 
middle of 1972 keen competition to lend their excess funds to all borrowers, including 
those intermediate firms who had remaind alien to the city banks until then, to such 
an extent that the share held by the mutual loan and saving banks and credit as-
sociations who had been the primary sources of funds to those intermediate firms 
actually dropped temporarily. Thus the outside debt ratio of city banks started to de-
teriorate again during the latter half of 1972. 
It would seem, therefore, that the japanese city banks are more sensitive to 
profit motive than to liquidity motive. As said earlier, even when money was readily 
available, as was the case of 1971 and 1972, they showed little willingness to increase 
their liquidity by decreasing their outside debt ratio. This inherent attitude of the 
city banks has drove the Bank of japan to exercise so-called "position guidance", 
which is nothing but another form of once-abolished window guidance, whenever it 
wishes to tighten money supply. 
The fact that the Bank of japan always tried to make the most of buying and 
selling operations and to expand them further since their start cannot be questioned. 
There have been some remarkable achievements accomplished, opening the way to 
a real open market operation. Nevertheless, there remains much to be done. For one 
thing, the Bank of japan should not be content with ensuring supply of funds re-
quired for consistent long-term growth of japanese economy. It must utilize the 
operations as a means of short-term or seasonal control, and possibly, to stabilize 
fluctuations of Treasury Account balances. The Bank is expected to assume the dual 
role with flexibility and decisiveness. 
That the difficult problems of overloan can be dealt with effectively, if not en-
tirely, can be seen from what happened in 1971. Still, the Bank of japan is obliged 
to maintain its position guidance so long as the commerial banks are not duly con-
scious of their liquidity position, a fact which owes to the inherent characteristics 
of the japanese finance structure. 
Although the commercial bill operations are conducted towards a particlar sector 
of financial markets, they nevertheless meet the basic requirements for open market 
operation. In the case of bond operations however, there are a number of problems 
whose solution will undoubtedly require many years to come before they could attain 
the maturity, because development of the market needs more than the initiative of 
the monetary authorities. 
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